老闆的文章

http://tw.nextmedia.com/applenews/article/art_id/32313152/IssueID/20100222

 蘇起辭職得太晚(家博(J. Bruce Jacobs))

 20100222蘋果日報

國安會秘書長蘇起最近辭官求去,此事實在延宕過久。在他的管理之下,國安會有如政府內的強勢「獨立國」,他的領導無方讓人訝異。

讓蘇起一敗不起的可能是他宣布台灣將會無限制進口所有部位的美國牛肉。當時我正與一些甫上任的吳敦義內閣高層官員會晤,他們顯然不知道發生了什麼事,也為此納悶了好幾天。

蘇起顯然相信對美國讓步有助於其他談判。然而,台灣人民和兩大黨內諸多立法委員卻對人民健康表達合法的關切。因此,台灣各界快速針對此事展開公投連署。台灣沒有必要在牛肉議題上對美國讓步,蘇起顯然犧牲了台灣的利益,同時也與最重要的盟國製造了不必要的衝突。 

 即使蘇起表現極差,他仍大權在握,因為他與馬英九總統十分親近。一位國民黨黨高層曾說,蘇起和馬英九「如兄弟般親近」。 

八八水災竟拒美援

就連國民黨內的政論家都表示,蘇起失敗的原因之一是他意圖討好敵人。所以他(200511月)在北京中共中央黨校演講時,一再重複中國的口號,卻沒捍衛台灣的利益。同樣地,在牛肉議題上對美國讓步亦是如此,他再一次地未能捍衛台灣的利益。

此外,蘇起常諉過於人。即使在他擔任不同政府要職時,曾深入參與前總統李登輝與中國的談判,但是他在2009年出版的英文書《台灣與中國大陸關係:一條尾巴搖擺兩隻狗》,不曾對李登輝說過一句好話,反而責怪李登輝和繼任的陳水扁造成台海局勢艱難。例如,他宣稱1994年中國強盜謀殺台灣旅客的千島湖事件,以及李登輝接受司馬遼太郎的訪問,都「傷害對岸(中國)人民的感情」(51頁)!他對台灣罹難同胞的關懷何在?他也未正視李登輝揭露國民黨原是外來政權的事實?

蘇起2005年至2008年間擔任立法委員時,也破壞台灣軍購的計畫。他宣稱2004年「強化國防公投」未過關──該項公投題目是「如果中共不撤除瞄準台灣的飛彈,不放棄對台灣使用武力,你是不是同意政府增加購置反飛彈裝備,強化台灣自我防備能力?」意味台灣不應該向美國購買包括潛艦在內的武器。這種論調導致國民黨主導的立法院沒有通過軍購預算。即使馬英九當時也批評國民黨立法委員,但於事無補。

從上述書中內容看來,蘇起對台灣不甚了解。他在書中兩次誤提葡萄牙曾統治台灣(285頁)。他還提到,絕大多數民眾都是「沒有知識的鄉下選民……也許根本沒有自己的意見。」(212頁)他在書中對外省人、客家人和原住民的想法表達關切,但卻沒有提到佔台灣七成五人口的福佬人(285頁)。蘇起顯然不曾與台灣福佬選民交流。

莫拉克颱風證明這種狹隘政策徹底失敗。當時蘇起宣布,台灣不需要任何外援。台灣長期飽受外交孤立所苦,就算台灣不需要援助,但任何為台灣最佳利益著想的人,當時都會歡迎美援。

胡為真是否能帶領國安會展現新氣象?他的紀錄看來令人質疑。

1988年在南非普利托里亞大學拿到博士學位,當時南非仍有種族隔離政策嚴格統治。外交官出身的他,曾欣然接受陳水扁政府的指派,2001年出任駐德國代表,2005年派駐新加坡。詭異的是,他2007年卻因抗議政府「去中國化」辭職。

2008年在立委和總統選舉大勝後,國民黨在馬英九領導的21個月期間每下愈況。若是繼續指派有如前獨裁者蔣介石和蔣經國時代的人物,例如前行政院長劉兆玄、蘇起和胡為真,馬總統只是與親信合作。 

新閣追求台灣利益

當馬英九這麼做時,他已將2008年總統大選時、誓言要將台灣認同發揚光大的雄心壯志拋到腦後。

如果馬總統不想只當一任失敗總統,他必須重振政府的台灣認同,賦予行政院長吳敦義和副院長朱立倫更多權力,為台灣追求真正的利益。 

作者為澳洲蒙納士大學亞洲語言與研究講座教授暨台灣研究室主任 

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/02/24/2003466473

Su Chi’s resignation long overdue

By Bruce Jacobs 家博

Wednesday, Feb 24, 2010, Page 8 

Former secretary-general of the National Security Council Su Chi’s(蘇起) recent resignation was long overdue. He ran the council as a powerful independent kingdom within the government, but his leadership proved surprisingly incompetent.

Perhaps Su’s biggest debacle was his announcement that Taiwan would relax restrictions on beef imports from the US. At the time, I was meeting senior officials in the newly formed Cabinet under Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義). They clearly did not know what was happening and confusion reigned for several days.

Su apparently believed that giving in to the US would help other negotiations. But the public and many legislators in both major parties expressed legitimate health concerns.

As a result, Taiwan will soon have a referendum on the subject. By giving in unnecessarily to the US on the beef issue, Su clearly sacrificed Taiwan’s interests and created unnecessary conflict with Taiwan’s most important ally.

Even though Su was performing poorly, he stayed in power as long as he did because he was so close to President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) that many described the two as close like brothers.

Critics, including those in the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), say that one reason for Su’s failures was an attempt to please his adversaries. When he gave a speech at the Central Party School in Beijing, he repeated Chinese slogans and failed to maintain Taiwan’s interests, just as he failed to do so on US beef imports.

In addition, Su tends to blame others. Even though he was intimately involved in former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) negotiations with China in his various senior governmental roles, in his book Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs, published last year, Su has nothing good to say about Lee. Rather he blames Lee and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) for all of the cross-straits difficulties. On page 51, he argues the 1994 Qiandao Lake incident, in which Chinese robbers murdered Taiwanese tourists, and Lee’s interview with Ryotaro Shiba “hurt the feelings of the people on the other side [of the Taiwan Strait].” Where is the concern for the feelings of the dead Taiwanese or for the truth in Lee’s declaration that the KMT was originally an alien regime?

As a legislator from 2005 to 2008, Su also hurt Taiwan’s attempts to buy arms. He claimed the failure of the national defense referendum in 2004, which asked “Should mainland China refuse to dismantle the missiles against us, do you agree that the government should purchase more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?” meant that Taiwan should not buy arms from the US, including submarines.

This argument led to the legislature failing to pass the arms budget. Even Ma criticized the KMT legislators, but nothing happened.

Su’s book makes it clear he lacks any understanding of Taiwan. He twice incorrectly says that Portugal ruled Taiwan (pages viii, 285). He also says that a majority of “non-savvy voters from the countryside … probably just did not have an opinion” (page 212). Elsewhere Su expresses concern for what Mainlanders, Hakka and Aborigines think, but he neglects to mention the ethnic Taiwanese that account for 75 percent of Taiwan’s population (page 285).

Typhoon Morakot proved the bankruptcy of such narrow policies. At that time Su declared that Taiwan did not need foreign aid. In a context where Taiwan has suffered from restrictions on its foreign relations, anyone working on behalf of Taiwan’s best interests would have welcomed US aid whether needed or not.

Will Hu Wei-jen (胡為真) provide new leadership in the National Security Council? His record looks doubtful. Hu obtained his doctorate from the University of Pretoria in 1988, when South Africa was still very much under apartheid rule. As a diplomat, he was happy to accept the Chen administration’s appointment as representative to Germany in 2001 and again to Singapore in 2005. Strangely, it was only in 2007 that he resigned to complain about “de-Sinification.”

After stunning electoral success in 2008 in the legislative and presidential elections, the KMT under Ma has declined spectacularly. In continuing to appoint such figures from the former dictatorships of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) such as former premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) and Su as well as Hu, Ma works with people for whom he feels an affinity.

But in doing so, he is forgetting his robust attempt to project an image of strong Taiwanese identity during his 2008 presidential campaign.

If Ma wishes to be more than a failed one-term president, he must reinvigorate his governmen’s Taiwanese identity and give such people as Wu and Vice-Premier Eric Chu (朱立倫) a greater ability to look after the country’s genuine interests.

Bruce Jacobs is professor of Asian Languages and Studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. 

 

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