2009年5月2日，澳洲正式宣佈國防安全白皮書。Kevin Rudd其實在4月25日的ANZAC DAY前夕揭露了主要的內了，The Australian也報導了相關的消息。這份國防安全白皮書，其實就是由我原本的博士論文指導教授Carl Ungerer所主導，裡面的強硬內容的確不像工黨的風格，不過以我的指導教授性格以及對中國的了解，產出這份國防安全白皮書內容，其實我根本都不會感到意外。
Kevin Rudd's push for missile supremacy
Patrick Walters, National security editor | May 02, 2009
THE navy will acquire a formidable arsenal of long-range cruise missiles for its new submarines, destroyers and frigates, able to strike at targets thousands of kilometres from Australia's shores.
The new-generation submarines and major surface warships will be fitted with land-attack cruise missiles with ranges of up to 2500km as Australia becomes the first regional defence force to have the potent weapons system.
The cruise missiles will give the Government "options to conduct long-range, precision-strike operations against hardened, defended and difficult-to-access targets, while minimising the exposure of ADF platforms and personnel to attack by enemy forces", the defence white paper says.
Reflecting the Government's consciousness that the planned maritime defence build-up could provoke criticism from regional neighbours, the white paper asserts that acquisition of land-attack cruise missiles is "fully consistent with Australian treaty obligations and customary international law".
The core of the Government's thinking about the far more potent next-generation defence force is that the risk of a major conventional war in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be ruled out.
"It would be premature to judge that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system," the white paper says.
"Shows of force by rising powers are likely to become more common as their military capabilities expand. Growing economic interdependence will not preclude inter-state conflicts or tensions short of war, especially over resources or political differences."
The Defence Department, with a current annual budget of $22billion, has been charged with the massive task of finding up to $20 billion in savings and efficiency gains over the next decade to pay for more than $100 billion worth of hi-tech equipment.
The Rudd Government has also decided it will produce a new defence white paper every five years to update national security risk assessments and keep abreast of the rapidly changing strategic dynamics in the Asian region.
"Force 2030 ... will be a more potent force in certain areas, particularly in undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and cyber warfare," the white paper says.
"It is conceivable that, over the long period covered by this white paper, we might have to contend with major power adversaries operating in our approaches - in the most drastic circumstance, as a consequence of a wider conflict in the Asia-Pacific region."
The white paper embodies Kevin Rudd's pledge to maintain an annual real increase of 3 per cent in the Defence budget until 2018 and 2.2 per cent beyond that to 2030.
The Royal Australian Navy has emerged as the biggest winner from the new defence blueprint, to be launched in Sydney today by the Prime Minister, with both its surface and submarine fleets set for dramatic expansion from 2020.
As previously detailed in The Weekend Australian, the new white paper, titled Force 2030, will double the number of submarines to 12 and replace the Anzac-class frigates with eight larger ships equipped with helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles and sophisticated anti-submarine sonars.
The RAAF will get about 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters starting with three squadrons of up to 72 planes as well as eight new long-range surveillance aircraft, expected to be the P-8 Poseidon, to replace the ageing AP-3C Orion fleet. In addition, the air force will also get seven high-altitude long-range unmanned platforms, possibly the US-made Global Hawk.
The army's regular infantry forces will evolve into 10 battalion-sized "battlegroups" and will get a new fleet of 1000 protected vehicles to replace the current generation of armoured personnel carriers and the special forces will also get a range of new equipment including vehicles.
In addition to the 30 MRH-90 battlefield helicopters the army is also getting seven new CH-47F Chinook transport helicopters to replace its existing D models.
The new submarines will be larger than the existing Collins-class boats, with greater range and capabilities including strategic strike, intelligence collection and to carry uninhabited underwater vehicles for surveillance and reconnaissance.
The submarines are expected to be about 4000 tonnes in size and will be able to stay longer on patrol but the Rudd Government has ruled out nuclear propulsion for the new boats.
They will be built in Adelaide in what is set to become Australia's largest-ever defence industry project, lasting 30 years.
The three new air warfare destroyers, already on order, will be equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 400km.
The RAN will also get about 20 "offshore combatant vessels" of up to 2000 tonnes which will replace the existing range of Armidale-class patrol boats, mine counter-measures, hydrographic and other specialised smaller vessels.
"The future Offshore Combatant Vessel will be able to undertake offshore and littoral warfighting roles, border protection tasks, long-range counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, support to special forces, and missions in support of security and stability in the immediate neighbourhood," the white paper proposes.
The navy will also get a fleet of at least 24 new naval combat helicopters equipped with advanced anti-submarine warfare equipment including dunking sonars and air-launched torpedoes. The white paper places far greater emphasis on anti-submarine warfare given the anticipated rapid expansion of submarine fleets in regional navies, led by China, over the next generation.
The permanent defence force will grow to about 58,000 personnel from its current size of 53,000. Defence's existing formula to compensate for annual inflation indexation to its cost base will now be fixed at 2.5 per cent out to 2030, which will also help fund the new capital equipment program.
"The Government has committed to sustainable funding arrangements for the Defence budget in future years to provide funding certainty for planning and real funding growth to meet the growing cost of the military equipment we will need in an increasingly demanding world," the white paper says.
Cameron Stewart, Associate editor | May 02, 2009
THE new defence white paper will transform Australia's defence for a generation, asking taxpayers to dig deeply in their pockets to fund the creation of one of the most potent military forces in the Asia-Pacific.
It foreshadows the most dramatic build-up of naval power since World War II, predicated on the belief that the rise of China heralds significant long-term strategic risks for Australia.
But the 140-page document, called Force 2030, to be released today, bristles with ambition and risk in equal measure. It is arguably Kevin Rudd's greatest gamble.
It seeks to defend the nation by creating a navy by 2030 with the teeth to deny even a sizeable enemy from dominating the northern air-sea approaches to Australia. This new navy will cost many tens of billions of dollars, easily the largest single investment since Federation. Yet it does so without broad agreement inside Canberra's defence establishment about the strategic rationale underpinning this build-up and with grave doubts hanging over the Government's ability to fund and manage this vast project or find enough crew to sail its new armada.
It also requires Australians to accept permanent real growth in defence spending for the next two decades regardless of economic circumstances. This amounts to a fundamental long-term shift in Australia's public spending priorities, a difficult proposition for any government to sell to voters, much less at a time of global recession.
The plan to double the submarine fleet from six to 12, acquire three powerful new air warfare destroyers, eight new well-armed and larger frigates, 24 new naval combat helicopters, a bigger fleet of more muscular patrol craft and to develop a serious anti-submarine warfare capability, represents a quantum leap in naval power for a mid-sized country such as Australia.
This, coupled with plans to purchase 100, rather than a smaller number, of the Joint Strike Fighters will create a formidable deterrent to any aggressor and will allow Australia to project power more deeply into the region than ever.
The white paper is calculated to place Australia firmly in the mid-league of military powers, below the nuclear nations but substantially more powerful than most other countries of similar size.
This build-up is a continuation and an expansion of existing defence policy, which gives primacy to the defence of Australia in a conventional war, rather than to involvement in non-state conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq. But it is also a clear, direct and, some may even say, provocative response to the rise of China.
"China will be the strongest Asian military power by a considerable margin," the white paper says. "Its military modernisation will be increasingly characterised by the development of power projection capabilities." The paper then chides Beijing for being too secretive about the pace, scope and structure of its military modernisation.
While the document does not admit this, the doubling of the navy's submarine fleet is a direct response to China's blue-water ambitions, which have seen it invest heavily in new submarines, including the building of an underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya, on Hainan Island, off China's southern coast. This naval build-up reflects Rudd's wariness about China's future strategic weight in the region. It also represents a victory for the China hawks within defence, including white paper author Mike Pezzullo, who argued that China's rise posed a potential threat to Australia's security and interests in the region.
The white paper all but ignores the conclusions of two spy agencies, the Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, which view China's military modernisation as a defensive response to US forces in the Pacific rather than as a factor that should drive the structure of the future Australian Defence Force.
The overt influence of China on this white paper is also unlikely to win the Government bipartisan support for the document. Opposition Leader Malcolm Turnbull said yesterday it made "no sense for Australia to base its long-term strategic policy on the highly contentious proposition that we are on an inevitable collision course with a militarily aggressive China".
The white paper accepts that the US will remain the dominant military power in the Pacific and globally in the next 20 years, but it says Washington is likelier to seek help from Australia.
"The US might find itself preoccupied and stretched in some parts of the world, such that its ability to shift attention and project power into other regions when it needs to is constrained. This is likely to cause the US to seek active assistance from regional allies and partners, including Australia, in crisis." It says it is conceivable, although unlikely, that Australia could find itself in conflict with a major power alone, without US support.
"We do assume that, except in the case of a nuclearattack, Australia has to provide for its own local defence needs without relying on the combat forces of other countries."
In particular, the white paper foreshadows a more active role for Australian forces in ensuring stability in the South Pacific.
In another jibe at China, which is wooing Pacific Island nations, the white paper says: "Australian interests are inevitably engaged if countries in the region become vulnerable to the adverse influence of strategic competition."
There will be heated debate about the emphasis given to naval and air power in this new blueprint.
The decision not to expand the size of the army beyond the present target of eight battalions will disappoint some, given that it has been the army that has borne the brunt of all recent deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq and East Timor.
As the US, under Defence Secretary Robert Gates, is seeking to realign its military to focus more on non-state conflicts such as Afghanistan, this white paper takes Australia in the opposite direction, preparing for larger-scale conventional warfare.
But the greatest risk for the Rudd Government lies in its ability to properly fund this white paper.
It makes a series of wing and a prayer assumptions about funding that look frighteningly fragile. It assumes the Defence Department can and will find an unprecedented $20 billion in savings merely through efficiency reforms, which can then be directed back to buy modern weaponry.
Almost every defence minister in recent decades has launched programs to squeeze multibillion-dollar savings from defence and every one of them has fallen substantially short of far more modest targets than the one in this white paper.
The Government says it will keep its pledge to have 3 per cent real growth in defence spending until 2018. It says there will then be 2.2 per cent real growth in spending from 2018 to 2030 as well as 2.5 per cent fixed indexation to the defence budget during this period.
Even if the governments of the future adhere to this commitment, it is unlikely to be enough to fund the ambitious equipment proposals outlined in this white paper. Almost without exception, the largest equipment purchases of the past two decades have been delivered late and substantially over budget.
The challenge of this white paper is to ensure that history does not repeat itself.
The last white paper to harbour as much ambition as today's document was the seminal 1987 white paper that enshrined the primacy of naval and air power and promised us the Collins-class submarines, the Anzac frigates and powerful upgrades to the F/A-18 Hornets.
The grand promises of that white paper came with a stated required level of military spending (between 2.6per cent and 3 per cent of gross domestic product) which was never achieved by the Hawke-Keating or Howard governments. For the past two decades defence spending has hovered at about 1.8 per cent of gross domestic product.
This created a dangerous imbalance between planned purchases and actual funding.
The result is that much of the force envisaged in 1987 is unfit for combat operations. The Anzac frigates, the Blackhawk helicopters and the Hornets cannot be sent to war because they lack sufficient electronic defence system. Only three of the six Collins-class submarines can be sent to sea because of maintenance issues and a shortage of crew.
Some of the promises of 1987 never appeared at all - such as the airborne early warning and control aircraft - and have been promised again in this white paper, 22 years on.
Having committed to such a substantial military build-up in this white paper, the Rudd Government and its successors cannot afford to be half-hearted in implementing it.
The other obstacle is that the dreams of this white paper cannot be realised unless the Defence Department solves its recruitment crisis. The navy can find enough crew for only three submarines, one-quarter of the number it will need to find to staff the 12 new-generation submarines from 2025.
Larger crews will be required by the new ships and more pilots will be needed to fly the 100 JSFs. Unless the Defence Department can find a permanent, sustainable solution to its recruitment problems, it risks acquiring a ghost fleet that cannot be sailed.
This white paper is not the coherent document many observers were hoping for. It hedges its bets and suffers from a disconnect between its strategic assessments and its proposed force structure.
This may reflect the haphazard manner in which it was prepared. The white paper initially was due late last year but was delayed repeatedly as the global economy crashed. Much of the document was leaked to The Australian ahead of time as well as details of the heated argument inside the department over China.
Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has lacked authority during its development, being undermined by a series of controversies involving himself and his department. Even the perverse decision by the Government to formally release the white paper today, on a weekend, with barely a day's notice, suggests a desire to avoid close scrutiny of the document.
But neither Rudd nor Fitzgibbon can be accused of being faint-hearted in their conclusions. They have sought to fundamentally recast Australia's place in whatthey believe will be a more dangerous and uncertain world.
It is a gamble that will cost Australians more than $100 billion during the next two decades.
Having committed to this blueprint, the Government's challenge is to realise its vision and learn from the lessons of the past.
Navy the winner in force boost as white paper delivers revolution
Mark Dodd | May 02, 2009
THE Royal Australian Navy has emerged as the main beneficiary of the long-awaited defence white paper, with a shopping list that includes a doubling of the submarine fleet, the acquisition of 20 heavily armed, helicopter-capable corvettes and an arsenal of cruise missiles.
In what will be Australia's largest single defence project, the navy gets 12 new-generation submarines, to be built in South Australia, with more range, endurance and capability than the six current Collins-class boats.
Eight new Future Frigates, larger than the current ANZAC class and equipped with the latest submarine-detection equipment, will be acquired..
In the wake of the $1 billion Seasprite debacle, navy's anti-submarine capability will be boosted by 24 new naval combat helicopters, eight of which will embark on ships.
A pooled fleet of 46 new MRH-90 utility helicopters will be shared with the army.
They will replace the navy's elderly Sea Kings and the army's Blackhawks.
As reported in The Weekend Australian last Saturday, 20 corvette-type Offshore Combatant Vessels will replace the 14-strong Armidale patrol boat fleet.
A new 15,000-tonne sealift ship will replace HMAS Tobruk, due to be retired in 2012. The navy's "battle tanker", HMAS Success, will be replaced by another ship of its class about 2015. Ship-to-shore transport capability will be enhanced by the proposed purchase of six new heavy landing craft.
The newly emerging threat of cyber warfare will be handled by dedicated Cyber Security Operations Centre and an analysis team of ADF and Defence Science and Technology Organisation personnel. The Government plans to strengthen the ADF's electronic warfare capability.
Australia will maintain regional air superiority with the acquisition of 100 fifth-generation F-35 "Lightning" Joint Strike Fighters, for the RAAF. Although it does not give a cost or a delivery date for the new fighter, the white paper leaves no doubt that in the mind of defence planners, the JSF is the best all-round replacement for the Vietnam-era F-111 and F/A-18 Hornets.
P3-C Orion surveillance aircraft will be replaced with a combination of seven strategic high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, supplemented by eight new maritime patrol aircraft.
Two additional C-130J Hercules will be purchased and up to 10 new light tactical transport aircraft.
The white paper contains few surprises for the army, which will be configured around three combat brigades, each of about 4000 troops. Army will get a new fleet of 1100 "deployable protected vehicles" to replace existing armoured personnel carriers and combat vehicles.
Its six CH-47D Chinook helicopters will be replaced with seven more capable F models and artillery will get new 155mm guns, both self-propelled and towed.
Japan bolsters forces amid Chinese military splurge
Mark Dodd and Debbie Guest | May 02, 2009
JAPANESE Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone has thrown his support behind growing regional alarm about China's military build-up, concerns reflected in the priority given to the navy and air force in the defence white paper.
Last September Kevin Rudd foreshadowed a substantial boost in defence capital equipment, citing concerns about an "explosion" in military spending in Asia, notably in China and India.
The white paper, the first since 2000, recommends a doubling of the navy's submarine fleet and the acquisition of cruise missiles capable of striking targets up to 2500km away.
Speaking in Perth yesterday, Mr Nakasone said Tokyo was worried about China's splurge on defence.
"Certainly in relation to China, as you've indicated over the last 21 years, China has continued to increase its military expenditure in double-digit figures, and from the point of view of the region it is an issue of some concern," he said.
On defence spending, Mr Nakasone said: "I think there always needs to be a certain degree of transparency in these matters and I think it's also important that countries - and I make no reference to particular countries - but countries endeavour not to cause concern to their neighbours."
No formal response from Jakarta was available yesterday although Abdillah Toha, a senior official of the National Mandate Party, warned Canberra not to meddle with Indonesia's territorial integrity: a reference to the 1999 Australian-led military intervention in East Timor.
"After all, (Indonesia) should not get involved in (Australia's) internal affairs," he said. "If we're going to continue to work together dealing with regional security issues, including illegal fishing, I think that's great."
The Weekend Australian understands that China has not given any official response to its briefing on the white paper and it is highly unlikely the country will issue a public comment.
Chinese leader Hu Jintao has reaffirmed his country's military plans are entirely defensive.
There are concerns in China about its relationship with Australia but they are broader than just defence and include Chinese investment.
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said no country need worry about the defence white paper's recommendations.
"It will be the first white paper that Australia has produced in nearly a decade," he said.
"It is of course not aimed at any particular nation, it is a defence white paper that will map out Australia's national security interests."
Additional reporting: Stephen Fitzpatrick, Michael Sainsbury
Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor | May 02, 2009
THE defence white paper is an almost incoherent blancmange of oddly unharmonised flavours.
It reads like a biblical commentary in which 50 Talmudic scholars, each representing an alternative school of thought, have been allowed to write alternative sentences.
The internal contradictions in the document are so staggering it looks like sentences have been bolted on almost at random, like pieces in a Meccano set manipulated by a two-year-old.
That's a bit unfair, of course. Each sentence bears some purpose: to answer some anticipated criticism, to give cover for some pet project, to allow squabbling bureaucratic tribes to have something nice to take away.
For all that, the Government has mostly come up with the right decisions: 100 Joint Strike Fighters, 12 new submarines, the continuation of the army expansion program, new, big surface ships and so on.
In defence, to some extent equipment and budget are real policy, the rest window-dressing. Australia's neighbours in the Asia-Pacific will look at the equipment commitments more than anything else. They will see the air force, the navy and the army getting bigger and more capable. That's all that really counts. The white paper will reinforce Australia's reputation as a formidable defence power.
Some of the doctrine will be of interest, however. White papers, despite being generally incoherent because of their internally contradictory bureaucratic dynamics, are generally bland. This is no exception. But a couple of sentences on China are, by white paper standards, remarkably direct and will confirm for everyone that the Rudd Government believes Beijing could do a much better job reassuring the region that its extensive defence build-up is not threatening.
The white paper comments: "China will be the strongest Asian military power by a considerable margin. Its military modernisation will be characterised by the development of power projection capabilities. But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours pause for concern if not carefully explained and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.
"China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan."
These are inelegant sentences and seem bizarrely to accept the proposition that it is entirely legitimate for China to build up forces designed to devastate and destroy Taiwan if it feels that's the decent thing to do.
This plastic gangster, faux hard man approach aside, however, these sentences state without much ambiguity that the white paper authors - that is to say, the Australian Government - believe China's military build-up is destabilising, inherently concerning and, given that the white paper says defence planning must be based on others' capabilities, not their declared intentions, something Australia should hedge against.
Asia-Pacific nations will pay some attention to these sentences. Their inherent judgment will be shared in every capital except Beijing. Beijing will be annoyed by them. So be it. Nonetheless, in its judgment of China, the white paper is sound, although at the same time it avoids the intellectual myopia of former defence bureaucrat Hugh White, who argued recently that the rise of China was virtually our only fundamental strategic consideration.
The white paper offers plenty ofencouragement for those who see a broader role for our defence forces. Indeed, there are one or more sentences to justify and encourage virtually every mainstream position in recent defence debates.
It's in favour of self-reliance and the defence of Australia, but it's also in favour of an expeditionary military culture, the need to be able to undertake a vast range of operations within the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, and everything else as well.
No doctrine goes uncelebrated in this white paper. Its internal contradictions, however, make it incoherent at times. Let me give you one prime example.
It says: "By some measures, China has the potential to overtake the US as the world's largest economy around 2020. However, economic strength is also a function of trade, aid and financial flows, and by those market-exchange measures, the US economy is likely to remain paramount." Got that? Clear on that?
Just for the record, the US economy is six times as big as China's. You can't bridge that gap in a decade.
The only statistical illusion that can give you a meaningless measure to justify the white paper's first assertion is to use the sleight of hand of measuring an economy by parity purchasing power instead of real dollars, and assume all the best-case scenarios for the Chinese economy. If you're going to do that in a defence document, you need to spell out what you're doing.
The white paper understands that its first assertion is silly and is somewhat ashamed of it. Therefore it contradicts it in the next sentence. Bureaucratic prose at its best.
That's a fairly trivial example, but they abound. A more important one concerns defence self-reliance.
The white paper asserts that Australia seeks self-reliant capacity to defend itself, without assistance, against anything but a superpower attack.
Then in the next sentence it says that "the capability, intelligence and technological partnership" that is at the core of our alliance with the US "is indispensable to our security".
In other words, we are entirely self-reliant provided the Americans hold our hands in everything that counts.
Similarly, the Government has gone a bit wonky on funding, projecting the 3per cent real increase only up to 2018, when the real big expenditure items start to kick in.
Yet there is no way on God's green earth that everything in this white paper can be achieved with those spending limits, even with the mythical savings from eliminating waste and inefficiency.
In the end, the main decisions are sound, the accompanying verbiage dubious. That, of course, is much better than the other way around.